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Abstract
In this note we investigate the infringement (entry) decision for a firm facing an incumbent patent
holder with uncertain patent rights. The entrant risks a dispute by entering, resulting in either a
settlement (licensing) or litigation and trial. Using the litigation model described by Priest and
Klein, we investigate the expected dispute resolution and its impacts on the entrant’s pre-dispute
behavior. The primary contribution is to show that the entrant’s expectations about the patent
holder’s beliefs about patent enforceability are a driving factor behind the entry decision. We
develop a simple taxonomy of entrant and incumbent types to explain the entry decision.
Keywords: patents, uncertainty, entry, patent litigation, patent infringement.
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1 Introduction
Since at least Priest and Klein (1984) (PK) scholars have been aware of the self-selection of disputes
into trials and the factors that influence which disputes go to trial. At the same time, in industries
where patent protection is important, scholars have pointed to the threat of litigation as an entry
deterrent (Choi 1998), or as a mechanism to influence the terms of licensing (Meurer 1989). When
the incumbent is protected by patent rights, it is natural to think of the entry decision as a decision
on the part of the entrant to risk an infringement dispute. In this way, the entry decision is
analogous to endogenizing harm in a general model of legal disputes (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989).
In tort law, both the injurer and victim can take precaution to avoid harm. In contract law,
the promisor can invest in effort to complete the contract, and the promisee can choose some level
of complementary reliance investment. In all these cases, some level of investment occurs prior
to the existence of any actual dispute. In patent cases, a dispute arises only after some alleged
harm has occurred–namely, infringement. Prior to the dispute entrants decide whether to risk
infringement. This risk can be thought of as a binary choice (to infringe or not), or as a continuous
choice (to take precaution against infringement, e.g., to invest in “inventing around” the patented
technology). The patent holder can likewise invest in monitoring, or in patent “thickets” that
increase the cost of inventing around (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). The incentives for the parties to
invest will depend on the likelihood of a dispute and the possible outcomes. Because the likelihood
of a dispute depends on the investment by the parties, it is endogenous.
This paper presents a simple litigation model that investigates the role of an entrant’s belief
about patent enforceability in its entry decision. By extending the litigation bargaining model
of PK, we are able to analyze the impact of expected litigation on the incentive of the infringing
party to enter and risk a dispute. We show how the entrant forms beliefs about the patent holder’s
estimate of winning the case in court. Beliefs about the patent holder’s beliefs are necessary for
the entrant to estimate the probability that the patent holder will accommodate entry, litigate, or
settle.
Our primary contribution is that the entrant’s beliefs about the patent holder’s beliefs are an
important component of the entry decision. Contrary to intuition, it is generally not the case that
the entrant’s expectation about the patent holder’s belief about winning is identical to the entrant’s
best guess. Instead, the entrant “discounts” its expectation based on known error rates. Based
on our results, we develop a taxonomy of entry based on the beliefs of the entrant. The results
highlight the importance of information in patent disputes (Meurer 1989, Schweizer 1989, Daughety
and Reinganum 1993).
2 Model
Over the last several years, scholars have increasingly departed from the notion of patents as
perfectly enforceable property rights. Rather than a “right to exclude,” patents are best understood
as a right to attempt to exclude or, simply, a right to sue (Lemley and Shapiro 2005, Marco 2005).
Litigation bargaining models implicitly recognize imperfect enforcement by accounting for litigation
costs and imperfect or asymmetric information.
We follow the litigation bargaining model of PK in order to examine the impact of the entrant’s
beliefs about litigation on the entrant’s entry decision. Our particular interest is in how the entry
decision is impacted by the entrant’s beliefs about the patent holder’s beliefs about enforcement.
We adopt several simplifications of the model. First, like PK, we abstract away from signaling
on the part of the patent holder. While signaling is potentially important, it is likely to be of
primary importance after a potential infringer is identified. Second, we assume that monitoring is
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costless. This assumption is purely for parsimony: monitoring will affect the likelihood of detection,
and thus the likelihood of enforcement. But, the effect is one of degree, not kind. Last, we do not
specify the type of post-entry competition that exists between the two firms, or the ability of the
firm to invent around the patent. That is, we do not model the factors that influence the returns
to infringement.
Following PK, we assume that whether an entrant is found to infringe a patent depends upon
the facts of the case and the legal standard. Conditional upon entry, the “facts of the case” are
given by Y ′. The legal standard, Y ∗, determines whether the entrant (A) or the patent holder (B)
prevails. If Y ′ < Y ∗, then the entrant’s technology is found not to infringe the patent and the
status quo remains. If Y ′ > Y ∗, then the patent holder prevails, and is awarded a judgment J .
Y ∗ is common knowledge; but, Y ′ is observed only by the court. A and B measure Y ′ inde-
pendently with error. Each party is ignorant of the other’s draw, but each is aware of the other’s
distribution. Formally, party i draws a guess about the facts of the case according to
Yˆi = Y
′ + εi (1)
where εi is distributed continuously, unimodally, and symmetrically with pdf fi() centered at zero
with variance σ2i . The corresponding cdf is given by Fi() and draws of the random variable Yˆi are
given by yˆi.
Party i’s beliefs about the patent holder prevailing in an infringement claim are given by Pi as
follows:
Pi = Pr(Yˆi + εi > Y
∗) = Fi(Yˆi − Y ∗). (2)
Pi is a random variable, with draws represented by pi = Fi(yˆi − Y ∗).
2.1 Bargaining
In the classic PK model, a sufficient condition for the case to go to trial1 can be formed based on
the beliefs of the two parties about the patent holder winning. If litigation costs are c for each
party, and if the size of the judgment is J , then the parties’ threat values (in expectation) are given
by
TB = pBJ − c (3)
TA = −pAJ − c. (4)
Two conditions must hold for the case to go to trial. First, litigation by the patent holder must
be credible. Second, there must be no cooperative surplus to settling.2 The credibility condition is
simply that B’s threat value is positive, or
pB ≥ c
J
. (5)
Assuming that settlement costs are zero, the litigation condition ensures that the sum of the threat
values exceeds the sum of the payoffs from settling. Because settling involves a pure transfer (which
1For the purposes of this note, we will use the terms “litigation” and “going to trial” interchangeably. In reality,
most filed cases are settled prior to trial. However, for the purposes of the model, we will assume that patent holders
will file a case only if they intend to go to trial. Thus, “settlement” in our model constitutes a licensing agreement
written after a dispute occurs, but without any formal filing of a suit. The difference is semantic.
2Together, the conditions are sufficient rather than necessary, because other factors may lead to trial even if there
is a cooperative surplus, e.g., animosity or imperfect signaling.
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may be zero), the sum of the payoffs from settling is necessarily zero. So, the litigation condition is
pBJ − c− pAJ − c > 0 (6)
pB − pA > 2c
J
. (7)
The litigation condition is identical to that of PK, and simply states that beliefs by the parties
must be sufficiently divergent for each party to prefer litigation to settlement.3 Strictly speaking,
the model does not require either party to have knowledge of the other party’s probability estimate
pi. It only assumes that if a cooperative surplus exists, that it will be divided in some way between
the parties.
Because inequality (7) can be written as pB > 2cJ +pA, the litigation condition is more restrictive
than credibility, i.e., litigation implies credibility. When litigation is credible and the litigation
condition does not hold, the parties settle. If litigation is not credible, entry will be accommodated
without a challenge.
For the entrant to prophecy about the patent holder’s response to entry, it requires an estimate
of pB in order to evaluate the credibility condition and the litigation condition. The question is,
conditional on its draw of yˆA, what is A’s best guess of pB? After forming a best guess of Y ′, what
does A think that B thinks? Can we assume that EA(PB| yˆA) = pA? In the next section we show
that in general, A’s beliefs about B’s beliefs are not equal to A’s beliefs.
2.2 Beliefs
A’s beliefs about B’s beliefs can be written as EA(PB| yˆA). Aside from the knowledge of the
underlying distributions, A’s only piece of information is yˆA. Because pB = FB(yˆB − Y ∗), A’s
expectation of PB reduces to integrating this expression over all possible values of yˆB conditional
on A’s draw of yˆA.
EA(PB| yˆA) =
∞!
−∞
FB(yˆB − Y ∗)fYˆB |yˆA( yˆB| yˆA)dyˆB, (8)
where fYˆB |yˆA(yˆB | yˆA) is the pdf–from A’s perspective–of YˆB contingent on A’s guess of Y ′. Given
yˆA, we can write YˆB as
YˆB = Y
′ + εB = yˆA − εA + εB. (9)
From the perspective of A,the random variable YˆB has a distribution with mean yˆA and variance
σ2B + σ
2
A. The corresponding pdf is given by fYˆB |yˆA().
The expression for EA(PB| yˆA) in equation (8) yields three results.
Proposition 1 lim
σ2B−→∞
EA(PB| yˆA) = 12 .
Proof. Intuitively, as σ2B explodes, any draw of yˆB will be less informative to the patent holder.
More formally, as σ2B −→ ∞, given any value of yˆB we know that FB(yˆB − Y ∗) −→ 12 . Hence, for
very large values of σ2B, FB(yˆB − Y ∗) ≈ 12 , and
EA(PB| yˆA) ≈
∞!
−∞
1
2
· fYˆB |yˆA( yˆB| yˆA)dyˆB =
1
2
. (10)
3 In the litigation literature, this is known as “divergent beliefs” or “relative optimism.”
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When the entrant knows the patent holder is uncertain of its property right, the infringer
expects the patent holder’s estimate of the probability of winning to be closer to 12 .
Proposition 2 lim
σ2B−→0
EA(PB| yˆA) = pA.
Proof. For sufficiently small σ2B, FB(yˆB−Y ∗) ≈ 0 if yˆB < Y ∗ and FB(yˆB−Y ∗) ≈ 1 if yˆB ≥ Y ∗.
That is, for sufficiently small σ2B, the patent holder knows almost with certainty whether it will
win. If yˆB is below the legal standard, then it will almost certainly lose, and if yˆB is above the legal
standard, it will almost certainly win. Because of this, for sufficiently small σ2B we can segment A’s
expectation into two parts
EA(PB |yˆA) ≈
Y ∗!
−∞
0 · fYˆB |yˆA( yˆB| yˆA)dyˆB +
∞!
Y ∗
1 · fYˆB |yˆA( yˆB| yˆA)dyˆB (11)
Because fYˆB |yˆA is centered on yˆA, for sufficiently small σ
2
B we can write
EA(PB |yˆA) ≈
∞!
Y ∗
fYˆB |yˆA( yˆB| yˆA)dyˆB = FA(yˆA − Y
∗) = pA. (12)
Proposition 3
""pA − 12 "" ≥ ""EA(PB| yˆA)− 12 "" ≥ 0, i.e., EA(PB| yˆA) ∈ #pA, 12$ if pA < 12 and
EA(PB| yˆA) ∈
%
1
2 , pA
&
if pA > 12 , with EA(PB| yˆA) = 12 if pA = 12 .
Proof. Proposition 3 follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
These results can be seen graphically in figure (1).4 The vertical axis represents probability
estimates, and the horizontal axis represents the known variance of the patent holder, σ2B. The
graph traces out the expected patent holder beliefs for two types of entrants–one with a high draw
of pA = 0.8, and one with a low draw of pA = 0.2. For very low σ2B, EAPB approaches pA, whether
that belief is high or low. As σ2B increases, the expected beliefs approach
1
2 , either from above or
below.
The graph is useful for understanding the impact of private information. In the extreme case
of σ2B = 0, the patent holder has perfect private information about the enforceability of its patent.
More generally, when 0 < σ2B < σ
2
A, then the patent holder has better information about the facts of
the case than the entrant. In the case of patents, this is likely to hold (Meurer 1989). However, the
entrant may have better information about its own technology and whether it infringes, especially
if some effort was made to invent around the patent; so, the possibility remains that σ2B > σ
2
A.
Before discussing the impact of beliefs on entry, we derive expressions for the expected proba-
bility of litigation and credibility.
2.3 Litigation
The expected probability of litigation cannot be determined by examining the mean, EAPB. My-
opically replacing pB with EAPB in the credibility and litigation conditions fails to account for the
known distribution of PB. To illustrate, suppose that pA = 12 and the patent holder has perfect
4Calculating expected beliefs requires a numerical solution. For the calculations, we assume that σ2A = 1, and we
allow σ2B to vary from 0.01 (close to perfect information) to 2.5.
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information.5 In that case, EAPB = 12 , and the litigation condition would suggest that litigation
does not occur in expectation. Because the patent holder has perfect information, the expected
belief represents a 0.5 chance that the patent holder’s belief is pB = 1 and a 0.5 chance that it is
pB = 0. The litigation condition could easily be met when pB = 1, for sufficiently low litigation
costs.
To formalize this intuition, the entrant must form beliefs about the probability of litigation,
pL, conditional on its draw of yˆA. To do this it will utilize its knowledge of the distribution of PB
conditional on yˆA, which itself depends upon the distribution of YˆB conditional on yˆA, fYˆB |yˆA().
This distribution is described in section 2.2.
The entrant’s belief about litigation, pL, conditional on yˆA is
pL = Pr
'
PB >
2c
J
+ pA
"""" yˆA( . (13)
If pA ≥ 1 − 2cJ , then pL = 0 because the patent holder’s and entrant’s beliefs will be sufficiently
close to avoid litigation. If pA < 1 − 2cJ , then the entrant must establish an expected distribution
of YˆB conditional on yˆA, in much the same way as it did when calculating EAPB.
pL = Pr
'
FB
)
YˆB − Y ∗
*
>
2c
J
+ pA
"""" yˆA( (14)
= 1− FYˆB |yˆA
'
F−1B
'
2c
J
+ pA
(
+ Y ∗
(
. (15)
fYˆB |yˆA() is distributed symmetrically with mean yˆA and variance σ
2
A + σ
2
B, with corresponding cdf
FYˆB |yˆA(). The probability that litigation is credible, pC , can likewise be derived as
pC = 1− FYˆB |yˆA
)
F−1B
) c
J
*
+ Y ∗
*
. (16)
Note that pC ≥ pL everywhere. Figure (2) graphs the probability of litigation, the probability of
credibility, and EAPB for three different types of entrants.6
3 Discussion
The analysis of entry and litigation behavior consists of a simple taxonomy. We present several
cases based upon 1) the credulity of the entrant, and 2) the quality of the information available
to the patent holder. The credulous entrant draws a high pA
+
pA >
1
2
,
and the skeptical entrant
draws a low pA
+
pA <
1
2
,
.7 Further, we define a well-informed patent holder to have a low value
of σ2B, and an ill-informed patent holder to have a high value of σ
2
B. A summary of the findings is
presented in table (I).
Although we have not modeled the exact payoff from entry, we can make several inferences
about the entry decision based on the results of the model. The results need to be interpreted
5A value of pA = 12 could occur due to a high value of σ
2
A. As σ
2
A increases, the entrant’s draw of yˆA becomes
less informative and pA will necessarily become closer to 12 . In figure 1, this has the effect of sliding both the upper
and lower curves towards the 0.5 horizontal line. In the extreme, pA ≈ EAPB ≈ 12 irrespective of the variance of the
patent holder’s draw.
6Each expected probability is graphed for σ2B from 0.01 to 2.5, and for σ
2
A = 1. Following PK, we set
2c
J
= 1
3
. We
restrict the domain in order to restrict the set of ill-informed patent holders to a reasonable limit, namely a variance
of 2.5 that of the entrant.
7Credulity implies that the entrant is “optimistic” in that it has a high value of pA. Because pA represents beliefs
about the patent holder prevailing, the entrant is optimistic toward the patent holder, not itself.
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conditional on litigation costs and the size of the judgment.8 We leave the formal modeling for
future research, but we develop some intuition about the entry decision below.
3.1 Entry
The primary result is that the expected belief EAPB drives the entry decision, and is a function
of both the credulity of the entrant (pA) and the quality of information of the patent holder (σ2B).
Whether the entrant expects litigation or settlement, its incentive enter depends primarily on the
patent holder’s bargaining position. By itself, expected litigation is not an entry deterrent, per se.
Litigation only occurs if there is no cooperative surplus to settlement: the entrant literally prefers
litigation to settlement.
When the entrant is credulous, and the patent holder is well-informed, the entrant expects
either an unfavorable settlement or litigation. And, it is pessimistic about its chances to win in
litigation. Unless the benefit to infringement is very high, the patent holder is most likely to opt
out of the industry altogether. If it does enter, it is more likely to enter against an ill-informed
patent holder, because the expected settlement (based on EAPB) is lower. The more ill-informed
the patent holder, the lower the expected license fee.
Deterrence is less likely for the skeptical entrant. The skeptical entrant always perceives itself in
a stronger position than the credulous entrant: it is more willing to litigate because it is skeptical
about the patent holder’s chances, and in settlement it will credibly demand a low license fee.
However, in the case of a skeptical entrant, the information of the patent holder has the opposite
effect in comparison to the credulous entrant. A higher value of σ2B will increase EAPB, making
expected settlement terms worse, and deterrence more likely.
The entrant, of course, cannot strategically control its level of credulity.
3.2 Litigation
In discussing litigation, it is useful to distinguish between the credulous entrant (pA > 12), and the
super-credulous entrant (pA ≥ 1− 2cJ ). The super-credulous entrant faces no possibility of litigation.
Because of the entrant’s very high belief about patent holder victory, the litigation condition can
never hold. This does not mean that the threat of litigation does not exist; it can be observed in
figure (2) that credibility, pC , is very high and generally increases with σ2B. In fact, for all entrants,
pC > pA. That pL = 0 should be interpreted to mean that super-credulous entrants will always
sufficiently agree with patent holders so that a cooperative surplus to settlement exists, if entry
occurs.
The credulous entrant is faces a risk of litigation, especially for low values of σ2B. Against a
patent holder with perfect information, the probability of litigation approaches the entrant’s belief,
pA (depending upon the size of 2cJ ). For sufficiently valuable infringement, we will observe entry and
high rates of litigation for credulous entrants facing very well informed patent holders. Litigation
is much less likely for ill-informed patent holders and credulous entrants. If there is entry we will
frequently observe settlement.
For the skeptical entrant, the quality of information of the patent holder enters in a very different
way relative to the credulous entrant: the probability of litigation increases in σ2B. The skeptical
entrant will avoid litigation and experience better contract terms against a well-informed patent
holder. Because credibility is so low with a well-informed patent holder, the entrant may expect
8 If J is interpreted as lost profits, then it will be highly correlated with the patent holder’s own use value of the
patented technology. To what extent this correlation extends to the entrant’s gross profits from infringement will
depend upon the industry structure and the technology in question.
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accommodation with no legal challenge. The increased credibility as σ2B increases is accompanied
by an increased risk of litigation and worse settlement terms.
While the probability of litigation, pL, is higher for a credulous entrant and well-informed patent
holder, this probability is conditional on entry. Credulous entrants are more likely to opt out than
skeptical entrants; so, skeptical entrants are more likely to self-select into disputes. For these cases,
we would expect a relatively low patent holder win rate. For sufficiently valuable infringement,
credulous entrants may enter and face a high litigation rate. In these cases, we will observe a
fairly high patent holder win rate. These effects represent a further refinement of the PK selection
hypothesis by endogenizing the entry decision.
4 Conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is to explain how the entrant’s expectation about patent
holder’s beliefs affects its entry decision. We show that the expected belief about winning is
generally not identical to the entrant’s belief. Instead, the entrant hedges its expectation based on
its own level of uncertainty and that of the patent holder, so that the expected belief tends toward
1
2 when patent holder uncertainty is high. In this way, the entry decision depends on the variances
of both parties’ errors in measuring the facts of the case.
Incentives for entry are inversely correlated with the entrant’s expected belief about victory.
Skeptical entrants facing well-informed patent holders are most likely to enter, and credulous en-
trants facing well-informed patent holders are most likely to be deterred. This is true even when
litigation is impossible, because it is the threat of litigation that matters rather than the probability
of a trial. Entrants facing ill-informed patent holders are between those extremes.
The results highlight the consequences of uncertainty in intellectual property rights. Uncertainty
can arise in at least two ways: legal uncertainty and technological uncertainty. With respect to
legal uncertainty, more clearly defined patent rights will reduce uncertainty for both parties, i.e., σ2A
and σ2B will be lower. The consequence is that credulous entrants will become more credulous, and
skeptical entrants will become more skeptical. Simultaneously, patent holders will become better
informed so that expected patent holder beliefs will tend towards entrant’s beliefs. As a result,
clarification of property rights will serve to further separate weak patents from strong patents.
Holders of strong patents will be able to appropriate more value in the form of greater deterrence
or higher license fees. Holders of weak patents will be less credible and more willing to accommodate
entry without a challenge.9
Technological uncertainty is more difficult for policy makers to control. Even so, better defined
patent claims at the Patent and Trademark Office, and well-specified legal doctrines about infringing
technologies (e.g., the “doctrine of equivalents”), can lower the uncertainty as to whether one
technology infringes upon another.
Whether greater legal clarity is efficient depends on the costs to the patent office and the courts,
and the benefits in the form of incentives for innovation.
9Clarification of patent rights will cause more cases to fall under regions I and V of table (I). Litigation will not
necessarily decrease unless all entrants become super-credulous. Litigation in region III is very high, and may replace
the lost litigation from region VI.
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Figure 1: Entrant’s expectation of patent holder’s beliefs
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Figure 2: Credibility, expected beliefs, and probability of litigation by type of entrant
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Table I: Summary of results
Patent holder
Entrant Well-informed Ill-informed
Super-
Credulous
I. Litigation credible
(Deterrence likely)
II. Litigation credible
(Deterrence or settlement 
with high license fee)
Credulous III. Litigation credible
(Deterrence or likely litigation)
IV. Litigation credible
(Deterrence or settlement)
Skeptical V. Non-credible litigation 
(Entry & accommodation or
settlement with low license fee)
VI. Weakly credible litigation
Entry & possible trial, possible 
accommodation, possible 
settlement with low license fee
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